Putin in Azerbaijan: Depleted by Ukraine, Russia plays a weaker hand in the South Caucasus

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan for the first time since the beginning of its full-scale war on Ukraine on Aug. 18, the latest significant development in the South Caucasus country’s delicate balancing act between East and West.
The visit comes amid a larger, historic realignment between the three countries in the South Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – and Russia.
As Moscow continues to face the fallout of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is seeking to reassert itself as a relevant player in the region. But an increasingly assertive Azerbaijan, buoyed by its recent military success against Armenia and signing of new gas contracts with European countries, is also seeking to redefine its relationship with Moscow.
“There is a saying that the only winner of the Ukraine war is Azerbaijan,” said Shujaat Ahmadzada, an independent researcher and analyst focusing on Azerbaijan.
“Moscow’s focus on the war in Ukraine has created a huge degree of flexibility/manoeuvring for Baku in the South Caucasus,” he told the Kyiv Independent.
The past few years have seen a fundamental reshaping of the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus vis-a-vis Russia, which began before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and has continued to pick up speed in the following two and a half years.
Winding back the clock before 2020, Russia’s closest ally in the region was Armenia, while it had frosty relations with Georgia in the aftermath of the 2008 war. Russian-Azerbaijani ties were complex, and though Russia was (and continues to be) the largest supplier of military hardware to the country, there is lingering resentment stemming from Russia’s support for Armenia, Azerbaijan’s primary geopolitical foe.
The extent of Russian assistance to Armenia in the first Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s has been debated, and while there is a perception from many in Baku that Russian support proved to be consequential to Armenia’s victory, Moscow played both sides.
In the years that followed the signing of the 1994 peace treaty, Russia deployed “peacekeepers” in Nagorno-Karabakh, ostensibly to prevent a new outbreak of fighting. Russian troops also have a base in the Armenian city of Gyumri and, until recently, had a detachment of border guards at the Yerevan International Airport.
However, after the Russian “peacekeepers” failed to act in either the Second Karabakh War in 2020 or the Azerbaijani lightning offensive in 2023 — both of which saw Azerbaijan reclaim its lost territory — Armenia’s relations with its longtime ally Russia have plunged to new lows.
Armenia has openly declared its feelings of betrayal and has instead sought to forge new partnerships with the West, going as far as threatening to withdraw from the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and making moves toward joining the EU.
Having essentially ended the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which long appeared to be a never-ending thorn in Azerbaijan’s side, Baku is now in a position to redefine its position in the region — and its relationship with Moscow.
Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a dinner and then held talks that the Kremlin said would focus on “international and regional problems.” Aliyev later personally drove Putin around the city, among other pageantry set-pieces.
The two leaders paid their respects at Baku’s Alley of Martyrs, which commemorates Azerbaijani citizens killed by Soviet troops in the  “Black January” incident of 1990 and the fallen in the first Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Azerbaijani Reddit accounts noted that the Russian media outlet RT falsely identified the memorial as one that commemorates the World War II and derisively remarked that it was indicative of Russia’s attitude towards its former imperial peripheries. RT’s post was later deleted.
The day after Putin’s trip concluded, Azerbaijan formally applied to join BRICS, one of the more concrete signs that Baku is seeking to solidify its position as a bridge between East and West.
Azerbaijan has been uniquely positioned to take advantage of Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine and diminishing influence on the country’s neighbors. Bordering both Russia and Iran, it is also an increasingly important trade hub — which carries with it allegations of sanctions evasion.
Aliyev’s authoritarian regime now holds a much stronger hand, not just against Russia, but vis-a-vis the EU as well.
Azerbaijan has maintained a type of strategic neutrality regarding Russia’s full-scale war, reaffirming its friendly ties with Russia just days before the beginning of the invasion but also providing at least 27.8 million manat ($16.3 million) in humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
There have been unconfirmed reports of some Azerbaijani weapons surfacing in the hands of Ukrainian soldiers, but it is likely that most of these weapons were delivered before the beginning of the full-scale war.
“Military aid (to Ukraine) would be a huge thing — which I don’t see the regime here in Baku wants to cross,” said Ahmadzada.
Despite Putin’s visit and the warm reception, Azerbaijan has also been unwilling to openly support Russia’s full-scale war, and its increasing military, economic, and geopolitical strength means that it does not have to.
“The messaging that comes from Baku on Ukraine (is) very clear about (the) territorial integrity of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders,” said Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
“They’ve been very clear on this from the beginning mainly because they’ve experienced something similar with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Coffey told the Kyiv Independent.
Coffey agreed that openly providing military support to Ukraine would likely be a step that Baku does not want to take. But as with the majority of other former Soviet countries, even those with close relations with Russia, it does not feel it has to provide military support to Moscow either.
“Azerbaijan benefited hugely from Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine, so it would be unwise for Baku to be supportive of Russia in this case,” Ahmadzada said.
All of this delicate balancing act remains unspoken, kept behind closed doors.
Coffey said that Azerbaijani officials are “quite clear whose side they’re on” in private conversations, and “there are many that are cheering on the Ukrainians” because “many see Russia as a threat.”
“But they would never overtly say this publicly, and they would never publicly arm the Ukrainians,” he added.
Russian gas still flows through Ukraine to Europe — transiting through Sudzha, the town in Russia’s Kursk Oblast captured by Ukrainian forces during their cross-border incursion — but that contract is set to expire at the end of 2024.
Azerbaijan has suggested that it could fill the gap by transiting Azerbaijani gas, which would still go through Russia, across Ukraine, and into the EU.
Several EU countries, such as Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia, are still reliant on the gas coming from the existing pipeline from Russia and would be in “serious trouble” if they were forced to find another alternative, Aliyev said in July.
Azerbaijan is also the starting point of the multinational, consortium-owned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that connects oil fields in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, which came online in 2006.
Zelensky said that he did not want to extend the gas contract with Russia and acknowledged that the Azerbaijani proposals were one of the alternatives being considered. While Russia would still get a cut as a transit fee, Azerbaijani gas would flow through the pipeline, not Russian.
It was not the first indication that Azerbaijan would likely begin playing a bigger role in the provision of energy to the EU.
Shortly after the beginning of the full-scale war, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed a deal with Aliyev “to deliver at least 20 billion cubic meters to the EU annually by 2027.”
Azerbaijan is “a key partner in our efforts to move away from Russian fossil fuels,” she said at the time.
In a statement that coincided with Putin’s visit, the Russian state-run energy giant Gazprom announced on Aug. 20 “the expansion of multifaceted strategic partnership” with Azerbaijan’s state-owned energy company SOCAR.
One of the chief focuses of Putin’s visit was on collaborative energy projects, including new oil tankers, as part of a larger plan to increase Russia’s energy exports toward the Indian Ocean — and away from Western sanctions.
“Russia’s outreach to Azerbaijan, especially the first official state visit in six years, is very much part of efforts to evade sanctions,” said Ben Dubow, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in comments to the Kyiv Independent.
While Russia appears to have its hands full in Ukraine, it is also unwilling to abandon what it sees as long-term interests and influence in the South Caucasus.
“It is clear, and everyone is aware, that Russia is also facing crises, including and above all in the Ukrainian direction,” Putin said in Baku.
“Russia’s historical involvement in the situation in the South Caucasus over the past few years dictates the need for us to participate in these events, of course, to the extent that this is required by the parties,” he added.
Statements by Putin and Aliyev at a joint press conference were full of typical pleasantries. Azerbaijan and Russia “act as allies, friends, close partners, and neighbors,” said Aliyev, a sentiment echoed by Putin.
In turn, Putin noted that the Russian language is “widely and freely used in Azerbaijan” and thanked Aliyev for his “attention” to the language issue. Both presidents extolled the economic partnership between their respective countries.
Yet, subtle differences in the way that the two leaders talked about the conclusion of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh shed some light on the transformed nature of Russia’s role in the region since February 2022.
While Putin said that “Russia will continue to do everything possible to promote the normalization of Azerbaijani-Armenian cooperation” based on trilateral treaties reached in 2020-2022, he did not mention the effective culmination of the conflict in 2023.
In contrast, Aliyev said: “After September of last year, a completely new situation arose in the region – Azerbaijan completely restored its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
“The stability and security of the entire South Caucasus region largely depend on close cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan,” he added.
While Russia will certainly continue to play a role as a regional power and economic partner, the rules have changed.
“There have always been three Russia’s for Azerbaijan: neighbor, hegemon, and mediator. Azerbaijan’s relations with Moscow have always been about navigating between different Russias,” said Ahmadzada.
But after both the full-scale war in Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh, “this Mediator Russia has become no more for Azerbaijan.”
Despite years of effort, Russian (and international) attempts at mediation failed, and the conflict was ultimately resolved by force, so it is unclear what more Russia can offer.
“Azerbaijan has accomplished pretty much everything it wanted to accomplish” by reclaiming its internationally recognized territories, Coffey said.
The victory did not occur in a vacuum but rather was the direct result of Baku’s likely reasoning that Russia, weakened by setbacks in Ukraine, would be unable or unwilling to do anything to stop it.
Having “tested Russia’s resolve to enforce the peace Moscow helped to broker after the 2020 conflict,” Azerbaijan “reasoned that Russia had no will or capacity to protect its treaty ally (Armenia),” CEPA analyst Dubow told the Kyiv Independent.